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Abstract 
As the usage of Cyber Forensics increases, so does the potential for errors in the practice of applying Cyber 
Forensic. Errors in opinions derived from faulty practices have resulted in grievous miscarriages of justice.  
However, utilizing the foundations of Information Systems Assurance and Information Quality, a solid foundation 
for improving the quality and effectiveness of Cyber Forensics can be derived. The foundations of Information 
Systems Assurance and information Quality provide a solid foundation for improving the current efforts in Cyber 
Forensics. With increasing computer and network systems usage as well as the increasing frequency of attacks on 
information systems, the need for controlling risks in information systems have become more apparent. Meeting 
that need, Information Systems Assurance has continued to evolve: from the CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability) into variations such as the five pillars (confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and non-
repudiation) and the Parkerian Hexad (confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, possession, and 
utility). Also, with the continuing growth of information systems, the need for improving the quality of such 
systems has also evolved focusing on various components of information Quality (accuracy, relevance, 
consistency, timeliness and completeness). Utilizing the foundations of Information Systems Assurance and 
information Quality a model is derived for Cyber Forensics Assurance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is not uncommon in today’s legal environment to have unsuccessful prosecutions based upon the faulty 
presentation of Cyber Forensics evidence and the resulting opinions and testimony given by “expert” witness. In 
defining unsuccessful, we can refer to cases where the guilty is not proven guilty or where innocent people are 
“proven” guilty when in fact they are not. These cases come to light when, ultimately, the opinions given and 
relied upon are repudiated. As such, the risk of repudiation needs to be minimized. Cyber Forensics Assurance is 
about reducing the risks of repudiation. 
 
“There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact.” 
Sherlock Holmes in The Boscombe Valley Mystery 
 
THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
In terms of research methods, it is hopeful that a better understanding of the assurance of computer forensics will 
result in better prosecutions of the guilty (having less Type II errors - or letting the guilty off) and less mistakes 
in finding innocent people guilty of actions they did not commit (having less Type I errors - or “proving that 
which isn’t so”). 
 
 “Guilt” as Hypothesis  
 
Guilt can be viewed as a hypothesis - one that states that someone’s actions are responsible for a certain 
consequence(s). 
 
The “Null” Hypothesis 
 
If guilt is the hypothesis, then the “Null” hypothesis is one which shows there is no relationship between one’s 
actions and the consequences in question. 
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“Innocent Until Proven Guilty” and the Burden of Proof 
 
Under U.S. law, one is considered innocent until proven guilty. In research terms this would be equivalent to 
having to reject the “Null” hypothesis to prove guilt. In effect, we are proving that the defendant is “not 
innocent”. The defendant does not need to prove the “Null” hypothesis - however, the prosecutor needs to prove 
that the “Null” hypothesis needs to be rejected. 
 
Type I Errors - False Positives 
 
Incorrectly rejecting the “Null” hypothesis when in fact it is true is referred to as a Type I error, or a false 
positive. In effect, by rejecting the “Null hypothesis” we are proving that the defendant is not innocent. By 
incorrectly rejecting the “Null” hypothesis, we are falsely proving guilt when in fact the defendant is innocent. 
 
Type II Errors - False Negatives 
 
Not rejecting the “Null” hypothesis when in fact it is false is referred to as a Type II error, or a false negative. In 
effect, by not rejecting the “Null hypothesis” we are not able to prove that the defendant is not innocent. By 
incorrectly not rejecting the “Null” hypothesis, we are unable to prove guilt when in fact the defendant is not 
innocent 
 
Blackwell’s Formulation 
 
The legal system’s willingness to accept Type II errors in lieu of accepting Type I errors is based upon 
Blackstone’s Formulation.  
"Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer."  
William Blackstone, English jurist 1760’s 
 
However to minimize the risk of either Type I or Type II errors an emphasis should be placed upon Cyber 
Forensics Assurance or minimizing the risk of repudiation. By minimizing the risk of repudiation, we maximized 
the quality of the Cyber Forensics analysis. 
 
INFORMATION SECURITY (IA) 
 
The Cyber Forensics Assurance Model herein is based upon Information Assurance which itself has its root in 
Information Security. One of the earliest models, or definition, or Information Security is the CIA Triad. 
 
CIA Triad - Information Security 
 
The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) defined three security objectives for 
information and information systems [FIPS Pub 199]: 
 Confidentiality 
 Integrity 
 Availability 
Confidentiality is defined as “Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information…” [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]. A loss of 
confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information. 
 
Integrity is defined as “Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes 
ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity…” [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]. A loss of integrity is the 
unauthorized modification or destruction of information. 
 
Availability is defined as “Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information…” [44 U.S.C., SEC. 
3542]. A loss of availability is the disruption of access to or use of information or an information system. 
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Figure1. Information Security Components of the CIA Triad 
 
Table 1. Potential impact definitions for each security objective—confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
[FIPS Pub 199]. 
 
POTENTIAL IMPACT  
Security Objective  LOW  MODERATE  HIGH  
Confidentiality  
Preserving authorized restrictions 
on information access and 
disclosure, including means for 
protecting personal privacy and 
proprietary information.  
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]  
The unauthorized 
disclosure of information 
could be expected to have 
a limited adverse effect 
on Organisational 
operations, 
Organisational assets, or 
individuals.  
The unauthorized 
disclosure of information 
could be expected to have 
a serious adverse effect 
on Organisational 
operations, 
Organisational assets, or 
individuals.  
The unauthorized 
disclosure of information 
could be expected to have 
a severe or catastrophic 
adverse effect on 
Organisational 
operations, 
Organisational assets, or 
individuals.  
Integrity  
Guarding against improper  
information modification  
or destruction, and includes 
ensuring information non-
repudiation and authenticity.  
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]  
The unauthorized 
modification or 
destruction of 
information could be 
expected to have a 
limited adverse effect on 
Organisational 
operations, 
Organisational assets, or 
individuals.  
The unauthorized 
modification or 
destruction of 
information could be 
expected to have a 
serious adverse effect on 
Organisational 
operations, 
Organisational assets, or 
individuals.  
The unauthorized 
modification or 
destruction of 
information could be 
expected to have a severe 
or catastrophic adverse 
effect on Organisational 
operations, 
Organisational assets, or 
individuals.  
Availability  
Ensuring timely and reliable access 
to and use of information.  
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]  
The disruption of access 
to or use of information 
or an information system 
could be expected to have 
a limited adverse effect 
on Organisational 
operations, 
Organisational assets, or 
individuals.  
The disruption of access 
to or use of information 
or an information system 
could be expected to have 
a serious adverse effect 
on Organisational 
operations, 
Organisational assets, or 
individuals.  
The disruption of access 
to or use of information 
or an information system 
could be expected to have 
a severe or catastrophic 
adverse effect on 
Organisational 
operations, 
Organisational assets, or 
individuals.  
 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) 
 
Information Assurance (IA) evolved from the definitions and concepts of Information Security. One of the initial 
definitions of Information Security is referred to as the CIA Triad. Later, Information Assurance incorporated 
the CIA Triad into a definition of Information Assurance referred to as the Five Pillars. 
 
Five Pillars of Information Assurance 
 
The Five Pillars of Information Assurance model is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) within the 
National Information Assurance Glossary, Committee on National Security Systems Instruction CNSSI-4009. 
That publication defined Information Assurance as "Measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. 
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These measures include providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, 
and reaction capabilities."  
 
 Confidentiality 
 Integrity 
 Availability 
 Authenticity 
 Non-repudiation 
 
The Five Pillars model added to the CIA Triad model the attributes of  authentication and non-repudiation which 
are not attributes of information or systems but are attributes used to describe the procedures or methods to 
assure the integrity and authenticity of information, and to protect the confidentiality of those same. 
 
Authenticity is the attribute of being authentic or of established authority for truth and correctness (Verification) 
– genuine –not fabricated. 
 
Non-repudiation is the attribute of assuring that the conclusions of an analysis are the complete and only relevant 
truth and cannot be repudiated. 
 
Parkerian Hexad  
 
The Parkerian Hexad, introduced by Donn B. Parker in 1998, also added to the CIA Triad model. Parker's Hexad 
adds the three attributes of authenticity, utility, and possession (or control). Confidentiality 
 Integrity 
 Availability 
 Authenticity 
 Possession or Control 
 Utility 
 
The attribute of authenticity in the Parkerian Hexad model, is not identical to the pillar of authentication as 
described in the Five Pillars. 
 
Possession or Control may be defined as reliable while Utility is defined as usability or usefulness. 
 
It is also noted that the Parkerian Hexad model does not include the Five Pillars attribute of non-repudiation. 
 
INFORMATION QUALITY 
 
Dimensions of Information Quality may be broken down in several ways including Intrinsic, Contextual and 
Representational. Several models exist focusing on different perspectives. Building upon the model of Fox 
(1994), Miller (1996) refers to several dimensions of Information Quality which can very well be applied to 
forensic information. 
 Accuracy – “Is the information factual?” 
 Relevance – “Is it the right information?”  
 Consistency – “Is it right all of the time?” 
 Timeliness – “Applicable to the appropriate timeframe?” 
 Completeness – “The whole truth?” 
 
Four of the five qualities of Information Quality are similar to various attributes in the Information Security and 
Information Assurance models while a fifth, Completeness, represents an additional attribute very relevant to 
Cyber Forensics testimony and can ultimately affect the attribute of Non-Repudiation. 
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FOUNDATION OF CYBER FORENSICS ASSURANCE 
 
In defining Cyber Forensics Assurance relative to its importance to investigations, it is important to take into 
account both the quality of information as well as the security and assurance of that information and the 
methodology used in acquiring that information. Perhaps in the legal system, where ultimately such information 
will be used to determine whether or not culpability or guilt has been proven, it is imperative that such 
information should be of the highest calibre. Too often evidence is given which “could” be true, but could very 
easily be repudiated. 
Synthesis 
In establishing a model of Cyber Forensics Assurance, the CIA Triad, the Five Pillars of Information Assurance 
the Parkerian Hexad and the dimensions of Information Quality were reviewed and synthesized as in Table 2. 
While some attributes of quality for a Cyber Forensics examination and analysis are well know and often taught 
or covered through rules of evidence, there were still cases where the outcomes of a cyber forensics effort were 
not correct and were later repudiated. In reviewing which attributes were common among the four models used, 
it was hoped that while some attributes were already being utilized within Cyber Forensics efforts, that it would 
be evident that there were additional attributes which could be utilized in a Cyber Forensics Assurance model 
which could be used to improve future Cyber Forensics efforts and hopefully reduce the potential for Type I, II, 
III and IV errors. 
Table 2. Foundations of Cyber Forensics Assurance 
 
CIA 5 Pillars Hexad IQ CFA Components  
      
Confidentiality – ensuring that information is accessible only to 
those authorized to have access  
     
Integrity/Consistency – perceived consistency of actions, values, 
methods, measures and principle – unchanged  “is it true all of the 
time?” (Verification)  
     
Availability/Timeliness – the degree to which the facts and analysis 
are available and relevant (valid and verifiable at a specific time) 
 
     
Authenticity / Original – quality of being authentic or of 
established authority for truth and correctness – “best evidence” 
(Validity) 
 
 
 
  
Non-Repudiation / Accuracy – transaction cannot be denied 
(Validity) – no alternate hypothesis  
  
    
Possession / Control – i.e. chain of custody  
  
    
Utility/Relevance – “Is it useful? / is it the right information?”  
   
  
Completeness – “Is it the whole truth?” 
 
CYBER FORENSICS ASSURANCE 
 
In defining the model of Cyber Forensics Assurance, the eight attributes used in developing the foundation are 
logically paired into the model represented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Model of Cyber Forensics Assurance 
 
CFA Components  
I 
a)  Confidentiality – ensuring that information is accessible only to 
those authorized to have access  
b)  Possession / Control – i.e. chain of custody 
II 
a)  Integrity/Consistency – perceived consistency of actions, values, 
methods, measures and principle – unchanged  “is it true all of 
the time?” (Verification) 
b)  Authenticity / Original – quality of being authentic or of 
established authority for truth and correctness – “best evidence” 
(Validity) 
III 
a)  Availability/Timeliness – the degree to which the facts and 
analysis are available and relevant (valid and verifiable at a 
specific time) 
b)  Utility/Relevance – “Is it useful / is it the right information?” 
IV 
a)  Completeness – “Is it the whole truth?” 
b)  Non-Repudiation / Accuracy – transaction cannot be denied 
(Validity) – no alternate hypothesis 
COMPONENTS OF THE CYBER FORENSICS ASSURANCE MODEL (CFAM) 
In the Cyber Forensics Assurance Model (CFAM), eight components are defined and paired into 4 sections. The 
four sections are as follows: 
 Section I 
 Confidentiality/Admissibility 
 Possession 
 Section II 
 Integrity/Consistency  
 Authenticity/Accuracy/best evidence 
 Section III 
 Availability/Timeliness 
 Relevance  
 Section IV 
 Non-repudiation 
 Completeness 
 
Section I of the CFAM includes the attributes of Confidentiality and Possession or Control.  Confidentiality 
relates to the distribution of information while Possession or Control relates to the distribution of the media upon 
which the information resides. Confidentiality is becoming more of an issue in the Courts as privacy is 
recognized and Protective Orders are issued placing constraints on Cyber Forensic investigations. Violation of a 
protective order can result in sanctions or of evidence being inadmissible. Possession or Control relates to the 
general maintenance and verification of the chain of custody of evidence used in a cyber forensics investigation. 
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In section I, Confidentiality, is rooted in the CIA Triad of Information Security and both the 5 Pillars of 
Information Assurance and the Parkerian Hexad. Possession or Control however was added by the Parkerian 
Hexad and omitted in both the CIA Triad of Information Security and both the 5 Pillars of Information 
Assurance. Possesion is very much a part of Cyber Forensics Investigations due to the necessity of maintaining 
chain of custody while maintaining confidentiality has long been noted as a quality of professionalism in cyber 
forensics. As such section I of the CFAM has a foundation in the attributes Information Security and Information 
Assurance and consists of attributes already well-know and required in Cyber Forensics. 
 
Section II of the CFAM includes the attributes of Integrity/Consistency and Authenticity/Accuracy. 
Authenticity/Accuracy is relative to the rules of evidence regarding hearsay as well as original or best evidence. 
Authenticity/Accuracy may be viewed as a way of maintaining Integrity/Consistency. 
“We must look for consistency. Where there is a want of it we must suspect deception.” 
   Sherlock Holmes in The Problem of Thor Bridge 
In section II, Integrity/Consistency is rooted in the CIA Triad of Information Security and both the 5 Pillars of 
Information Assurance and the Parkerian Hexad. Authenticity/Accuracy was introduced as part of Information 
Assurance and not covered in the CIA Triad of Information Security. Authenticity/Accuracy has already been 
very much a part of Cyber Forensics Investigations due to its application to rules of evidence. 
Integrity/Consistency has also been very much a part of Cyber Forensics Investigations. As such section II of the 
CFAM also has a foundation in the attributes Information Security and Information Assurance and consists of 
attributes already well-know and required in Cyber Forensics. 
 
Section III of the CFAM includes the attributes of Availability/Timeliness and Relevance. Determining the 
availability and timeframe of evidence is an important step in determining relevance. It is important to not only 
determine if facts are true, but whether they were true for the given timeframe and environment.  
It is section III of the CFAM where the contribution of the Information Security model and the Information 
Assurance models begins to become apparent, especially when also compared to the Information Quality model.  
“There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact.” 
   Sherlock Holmes in The Boscombe Valley Mystery 
 
There have been cases where facts are presented  which may in fact be true, but have little to do with accepting 
or rejecting the “Null” hypothesis - that is whether or not a defendant’s action(s) may be responsible for certain 
consequences.  These errors could be because the facts were not relevant to the time period in question or may 
have had nothing to do the relationship between the defendant’s action(s) and the consequence(s) in question. In 
research, these have been referred to as Type II and Type IV errors. 
 type III errors - In 1974, Ian Mitroff and Tom Featheringham defined type III errors as either "the 
error... of having solved the wrong problem... when one should have solved the right problem" or "the 
error... [of] choosing the wrong problem representation... when one should have... chosen the right 
problem representation“ arguing that "one of the most important determinants of a problem's solution is 
how that problem has been represented or formulated in the first place". (from Wikipedia - emphasis 
added) 
 Type IV error - In 1970, L. A. Marascuilo and J. R. Levin proposed a "fourth kind of error" — a 
"Type IV error" — which they defined as being the mistake of "the incorrect interpretation of a 
correctly rejected hypothesis" (from Wikipedia - emphasis added) 
 
Section IV of the CFAM includes the attributes Completeness and Non-repudiation – ensuring that the facts and 
conclusions of the analysis cannot be repudiated. Often “expert” witness opinions are dangerously given in 
which conclusions are inductive instead of deductive. Unfortunately, using inductive reasoning might determine 
that the facts support the conclusions the rather than determining that the facts support the conclusions and only 
those conclusions. If the facts can support another conclusion, then non-repudiation is a very real possibility. In 
determining conclusions, alternate conclusions (or alternate hypotheses) should be considered so as to provide a 
complete, or thorough, analysis. 
“One should always look for a possible alternative, and provide  
against it. It is the first rule of criminal investigation.” 
   Sherlock Holmes in The Adventure of Black Peter 
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In addition to section III, section IV also has a significant contribution from primarily the Parkerian Hexad 
model and the Information Quality model. The attribute added by utilizing the Information Quality model is the 
attribute of completeness. It is here that the idea of reviewing all potential “alternate” hypotheses against the 
“Null” hypothesis becomes tantamount to assuring Non-repudiation. In fact, the Guidelines for Expert Witnesses 
in the Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia states “an expert witness does not compromise objectivity 
by defending, forcefully if necessary, an opinion based on the expert’s specialised knowledge which is genuinely 
held … but may do so [compromise] if the expert is, for example, unwilling to give consideration to alternative 
factual premises or is unwilling, where appropriate, to acknowledge recognised differences of opinion or 
approach between experts in the relevant discipline.” (emphasis added). Generally, Cyber Forensics 
professionals are professionally, and ethically, committed to being unbiased, but not necessarily oriented to the 
concept of non-repudiation. A greater recognition of the importance of Cyber Forensics Assurance, and 
specifically greater focus on assuring non-repudiation coud result in less Type I, II, III, and IV errors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The definition of a Cyber Forensics Assurance Model (CFAM) is useful in understanding the attributes of a 
thorough, professional and successful investigation involving electronic evidence. The CFAM can be further 
developed to assist in the training of Cyber Forensics professionals as a way of conducting complete 
investigations which will be less prone to repudiation. In terms of research methods, it is hopeful that a better 
understanding of CFA will result in better prosecutions of the guilty (having less Type II errors - or letting the 
guilty off) and less mistakes in finding innocent people guilty of actions they did not commit (having less Type I 
errors - or “proving that which isn’t so”). 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH AND APPLICATION 
 
The application of the Cyber Forensics Assurance Model (CFAM) will hopefully result in a better understanding 
of how to conduct investigations compliant with the changing legal and technological landscape. As privacy 
becomes more and more of a “victim” in investigations, it is important to develop better methods in conducting 
investigations. The ongoing changes in technology also represent major challenges in conducting successful 
Cyber Forensic investigations. It is hopeful the CFAM can provide a framework in developing better methods to 
meet these challenges.  
